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Die Charakterisirung des Menschen als eines 
vernünftiges Thieres liegt schon in der Gestalt 
und Organisation seiner Hand, seiner Finger	
und Fingerspitzen,	deren theils Bau, theils zar-
tes Gefühl, dadurch die Natur ihn nicht für eine 
Art der Handhabung der Sachen, sondern un-
bestimmt für alle, mithin für den Gebrauch der 
Vernunft geschickt macht, und dadurch die 
technische oder Geschicklichkeitsanlage seiner 
Gattung al seines vernünftigen	 Thieres be-
zeichnet hat (Kant	1880,	255). 
1. Introduction: The Question of Man in the Light of the Philo-
sophical Anthropology and Its Relationship with Science
Since	the	rise	of	the	philosophical	anthropology	the	question	of	man	has	been	
addressed	 in	 a	renewed	way	 in	 respect	 of	 the	classically	 philosophical	 tradi-
tion.	The	distinctive	aspect	of	the	innovation	is	of	course	the	strengthening	of	
the	 relationship	 with	 science:	 the	 philosophical	consideration	of	man	cannot	
put	aside	the	urgency	of	a	confrontation	with	the	most	recent	results	achieved	
in	 the	 field	of	 those	sciences	concerning	man	as	 a	scientific	object.	 It	 follows	
that	the	worth	of	the	philosophical	analysis	depends	on	the	possibility	of	vali-
dating	 the	 philosophical	 statements,	 taking	 in	 consideration	 their	 scientific	
coherence.	
This	 methodological	 issue	 seems	 to	 represent	 a	 precise	 heritage	 of	 the	 old	
Kantianism,	according	to	which	between	the	transcendental	method	–	i.	e.	phi-
losophy	–	and	the	mathematical	physics	–	i.	e.	science	–	ran	a	precise	intercon-
nection.	 Hence	 the	 epistemological	 status	 of	 the	 philosophical	 anthropology	
seems	 to	 be	 comparable	 with	 that	 of	 the	 upheld	 “particular	 metaphysics	 of	
nature”	 in	 Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (Kant	 1911,	
469-479),	 insofar	 as	 the	 necessity	 of	 basing	 the	 validity	 of	 the	 philosophical
statements	on	the	scientific	results	does	not	hamper	the	metaphysical	tension
of	the	philosophical	inquiry.	The	philosophical	anthropology	seems	to	look	for
a	systematic	connection	of	all	those	data	coming	from	the	field	of	science,	but
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in	this	process	it	autonomously	elaborates	the	meaning	of	the	scientific	results	
and	 reaches	 an	 abstracter	 and	 comprehensive	 explanation.	 Its	 main	 achieve-
ment	could	 indeed	summed	up	in	a	general	definition	of	 the	essence	of	man,	
even	 though	 this	 essence	 has	 completely	 lost	 its	 metaphysical	 configuration	
and	presents	itself	with	a	dynamical	tension.	This	inner	tendency	can	be	con-
sidered	as	a	shared	presumption	by	all	the	authors,	and	can	be	reconstructed	
starting	 from	 an	 apparently	 divergent	 opinion,	 upheld	 by	 the	 biologist	 Jakob	
von	 Uexküll.	 He	 developed	 a	 theoretical	 biology	 warmly	 inspired	 by	 Kant’s	
thought,	sketching	a	functional	theory	of	perception,	according	to	which	every	
living	being	is	capable	of	forming	its	own	environment	(von	Uexküll	1928,	1-3,	
99-100;	Kriszat-von	Uexküll	1956,	19-30).	However,	if	this	definition	is	in	con-
trast	 with	 the	 generally	 anthropocentric	 argument	 of	 the	 “animal	 rationale”,
and	seems	to	refute	the	difference	between	“man”	and	“animal”	–	which	they
are	both	now	capable	of	 forming	 their	own	world	–,	we	must	notice	 that	 the
capacity	 of	 building	 the	 different	 connections	 laying	 the	 foundations	 of	 the
different	“environments”,	reveals	a	different	degree	of	 freedom	in	 the	human
sphere.	 In	 respect	 of	 Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen,
Adolf	 Portmann	 (Portmann	 1956,	 10-11)	 has	 pointed	 out	 that	 this	 human
specificity	 consists	 in	 the	 individuation	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 the	 “comprehending”
(Verstehen	 or	 Verstehensmöglichkeit),	 because	 the	 circumstance	 that	 in	 the
same	species	rises	up	the	possibility	of	discerning	between	the	different	sorts
of	connections	and	environment	building	(the	oak	of	the	old	man,	the	oak	of	a
young	 boy,	 the	 ray	 of	 light	 of	 the	 physicist	 and	 that	 of	 the	 physiologist	 etc.;
Kriszat-von	Uexküll	1956,	94-101),	can	be	solely	explained	by	bearing	in	mind
the	 general	 form	 of	 intentionality,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 different	 “world”
shapes	can	be	derived.	In	a	few	words,	a	new	level	of	acquaintance	seems	to	be
gained,	in	the	human	dimension,	as	regard	the	world	forming	capacity.
The	 possibility	 of	 reaching	 the	 unity	 of	 meaning,	 which	 is	 witnessed	 by	 von
Uexküll	 by	 recalling	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 unity	 of	 nature	 behind	 the	 apparent
diversity	of	the	different	natures	of	the	chemist,	of	the	physicist	etc.	(Kriszat-
von	Uexküll	1956,	101),	 is	 the	decisive	step	allowing	us	to	 figure	out	the	hu-
man	 “interior	 world”	 (Innenwelt)	 as	 a	 symbolic	 one.	 In	 von	 Uexküll’s	 theory,
there	is,	as	we	have	stated	before,	a	precise	degree	of	freedom	for	each	species,
insofar	as	between	«Merkwelt»	and	«Wirkwelt»	takes	place	the	«Innenwelt»,	a
special	 answer	 of	 the	 living	 being	 to	 the	 stimuli	 coming	 from	 the	 external
world	(Merkwelt).	Through	the	action	of	this	interior	world,	the	external	envi-
ronment	seems	 to	be	shaped	by	an	 inner	power	of	 the	 living	being,	which	 is
however	 specific	 to	 every	 different	 living	 being.	This	means	 that	 in	 principle
every	shaped	world	is	different	from	the	other	(there	is	no	common	world	to
birds	 in	 general,	 but	 solely	 the	 hawk’s	 world,	 the	 eagle’s	 world	 etc.).	 Hence
Portmann,	 as	 we	have	clarified	 before,	 underlines	 that	 the	 danger	 lies	 in	 the
attempt	 to	 acritically	 apply	 the	 Umwelt	 theory	 to	man,	since	 the	unity	 of	 the
comprehension	has	been	discovered.	The	predominance	of	the	unity	of	mean-
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ing	implies	indeed	the	emergence	of	a	peculiar	distance	between	man	and	the	
biological	constitution	of	his	environment,	so	that	his	action	and	his	theoreti-
cal	 activity	 solely	 take	 place	 within	 this	 distance:	 if	 we	 can	 for	 sure	 take	 for	
granted	that	the	world	of	a	young	man	is	not	the	same	world	of	a	skilled	physi-
cian,	we	can	at	the	same	time	depict	the	general	form	of	the	connection	lead-
ing	 to	 the	 particularization	 of	 each	 environment.	 This	 implies	 that	 we	 must	
seek	 a	 special	 principle	 of	 the	 “forming”	 in	 the	 human	 interior	 world,	 which	
overcomes	every	specialization,	and	that,	however,	makes	the	latter	possible.	
Nevertheless,	I	must	confess	that	the	present	paper	will	not	address	the	ques-
tion	of	the	particular	side	of	the	“forming”,	but	it	will	be	rather	focused	on	the	
definition	of	the	general	aspect	of	the	acting.	According	to	the	mentality	of	the	
philosophical	 anthropologists	 and	 of	 the	 transcendental	 philosophy,	 it	 will	
endorse	 a	 confrontation	 of	 the	 philosophical	 theory	 with	 science’s	 achieve-
ments:	I	should	particularly	show,	from	the	one	hand,	how	much	the	capacity	
of	 stepping	 back	 from	 his	 environment	 is	 somehow	 biologically	 constitutive	
for	the	human	being	–	and	I	know,	there	is	already	something	out	there	–,	and,	
from	the	other	hand,	how	in	the	code	of	biology	is	written	the	grammar	of	the	
human	symbolic	freedom.	In	order	to	do	that,	I	shall	compare	Cassirer’s	defini-
tion	of	man	as	“animal	symbolicum”	with	Leroi-Gourhan’s	palaeoanthropolo-
gy.	
At	the	basis	of	this	aim	there	are	several	reasons,	but	the	most	important	one	
is	 the	 following.	 From	 the	 transcendental	 point	 of	 view,	 it	 should	 always	 be	
possible	 to	 describe	 a	 “metaphysical”	 theory	 which	 is	 prior	 to	science,	 but	 it	
cannot	leave	behind	the	reference	to	scientific	data	and	results.	However,	sci-
ence	 is	 always	 in	 progress	 and	 goes	 through	 both	 paradigmatic	 and	 specific	
changes:	the	question	is	here	whether	to	this	mutations	in	the	scientific	field	
do	correspond	some	modifications	of	the	philosophical	system	of	knowledge.	
Cassirer’s	 answer	 to	 this	 tough	 problem	 is	 that	 these	 modifications	 are	 not	
only	possible,	but	also	necessary,	because	the	history	of	science	is	the	history	
of	the	discovery	of	the	a priori functions	of	reason;	according	to	this	approach,	
the	 logical	 structures	 of	 reason	 reveal	 themselves	 through	 the	 evolution	 of	
science,	and	thus	they	can	apparently	change,	but	at	the	end	of	this	process	we	
can	 always	 find	 something	 which	 is	 pretty	 stable	 and	 that	 can	 just	 be	 envis-
aged	 as	 an	 a priori (Cohen	 1987,	 B6/C10;	 Cassirer	 1999,	 13).	 Nevertheless,	
this	 “functionalization”	 of	 the	 a priori (Ibongu	 2011,	 29;	 Ferrari	 1996,	 119-
120)	compels	us	to	recognize	that	the	metaphysical	structure	of	a	philosophy	
of	science	can	never	be	considered	as	a	definitive	system,	and	that	this	system	
must	be	revisited	every	time	that	within	science	significant	changes	have	been	
occurred.	 Even	 though	 Cassirer	 himself	 has	 faced	 the	 consequences	 of	 this	
dynamics	of	the	a priori	(see	Ferrari	2003,	142-148),	the	task	of	comparing	the	
metaphysical	 part	 of	 the	 system	 with	 what	 comes	 from	 scientific	 knowledge	
can	 never	 be	 considered	 as	 an	 ended	 task.	 The	 open	 confrontation	 between	
philosophy	 and	 science	 must	 be	 indeed	 an	 infinitive	 purpose	 of	 the	 critical	
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method,	 and	 this	 basically	 means	 that	 a	 result	 achieved	 in	 the	 philosophical	
field	have	to	be	always	“up	to	date”	as	regards	the	posterior	evolution	of	sci-
ence.	If	we	have	sketched	a	functional	theory	of	knowledge	starting	from	clas-
sical	mechanics	and	from	the	physics	of	the	19th	century,	we	are	compelled	to	
verify	this	approach	by	testing	it	with	the	results	of	the	theory	of	relativity	and	
those	of	the	quantum	mechanics.	This	must	remain	valid	for	the	philosophical	
anthropology	too.	If	we	would	like	to	prove	Cassirer’s	definitions,	we	must	not	
only	limit	ourselves	to	sketch	the	relationship	between	Cassirer	and	the	scien-
tific	theories	he	referred	to	and	that	he	expressly	quoted,	but	we	have	especial-
ly	 to	 bring	 into	 play	 those	 scientific	 issues	 arose	 after	 him.	 This	 is	 very	 im-
portant,	insofar	as	if	we	solely	describe	Cassirer’s	direct	references	we	would	
obtain	a	circular	explanation:	it	is	fairly	clear	that	Cassirer’s	philosophical	the-
ory	is	proved according	to	the	sources	he	used.	This	is	the	reason	why	we	must	
take	in	consideration	Leroi-Gourhan’s	work,	flourished	a	few	years	later	Cassi-
rer	 died	 in	 1945.	 Leroi-Gourhan’s	 pivotal	 book	 –	 Gesture and Speech –	 is	 not	
only	 a	 document	 in	 which	 the	 palaeontological	 research	 was	 brilliantly	 and	
profoundly	 explained,	 but	 also	 a	 magnificent	 compendium	 of	 philosophical	
anthropology.	The	study	of	the	human	evolution	affords	him	the	possibility	of	
describing,	alongside	the	punctual	explanation	of	the	development	of	the	ana-
tomical	 and	 physiological	 characteristics	 of	 the	 species,	 the	 inner	 process	
which	 links	 the	 biologically	 technological	 disposition	 of	 man	 to	 its	 symbolic	
meaning.	Man’s	evolution	can	be	regarded	as	a	continuous	history	of	“libera-
tion”:	from	the	first	paleoanthropian,	whose	erect	posture	implied	the	freedom	
of	the	hand	from	the	ground	and	the	consequent	development	of	the	brain	and	
skull,	 to	 the	 invention	 of	 graphism,	 we	 can	 follow	 all	 the	 progressive	 libera-
tions	that,	starting	from	biology,	culminate	in	the	final	stage	of	a	spiritual	di-
mension,	 into	 which	 the	 relationship	 with	 the	 external	 world	 is	 guided	 by	
symbols.	
This	does	neither	mean	of	course	that	we	will	exclusively	focus	on	the	attempt	
of	 validating	 Cassirer’s	 theory	 through	 Leroi-Gourhan’s	 palaeontology,	 nor	
that	we	will	interpret	the	latter	as	a	mere	confirmation	of	the	former;	we	must	
rather	seek	a	more	general	formulation,	according	to	which	the	profound	rea-
sons	of	the	one	can	become	those	of	the	other.	We	have	basically	to	show	that	
the	symbolic	 tension	of	 the	human	acting	can	be	 derived	 from	 the	biological	
evolution	of	man,	as	well	as	this	evolution,	seen	as	a	history	of	liberations,	can	
be	 interpreted	as	a	general	symbolic	 tension,	whose	articulation	can	be	con-
ceived	on	the	basis	of	a	phenomenological	theory	of	Spirit:	there	are	different	
degrees	of	“freedom”,	within	which	every	stage	represent	a	“level”	of	the	con-
sciousness	 of	 the	 process	 of	 liberation.	 We	 will	 have,	 for	 instance,	 the	 first	
stage	of	the	biological	liberation,	characterized	by	the	mere	freedom	from	the	
ground	and	the	definition	of	the	anatomical	basis	of	the	humankind,	in	which	
the	degree	of	freedom	is	very	low;	then	we	will	go	through	the	development	of	
a	more	and	more	sophisticated	 technological	ability,	by	means	 of	which	man	
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becomes	 able	 to	 manipulate	 reality	 through	 the	 fabrication	 of	 complicated	
artifacts;	as	third	moment,	we	will	observe	the	emergence	of	the	first	form	of	
socialization	 and	 so	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 primitive	 culture,	 which	 has	 been	 made	
possible	 by	 the	 parallel	 evolution	 of	 language.	 Each	 stage	 implies,	 as	 stated	
above,	a	liberation	from	the	biological	nature,	till	the	point	that	in	the	form	of	
language	our	link	to	the	biological	world	seems	to	be	lost:	through	the	capacity	
of	“naming”	things,	we	become	master	of	 things	and	thus	of	nature	itself	(Gn 
1:26-2:25).	The	symbolization	and	the	liberation	still	show,	in	any	case,	their	
biologically	technological	roots,	insofar	as	language	as	well	as	science	are	typi-
cally	conceived	as	systems	of	signs,	viz.	as	syntactical	codes	whose	basic	char-
acteristic	is	the	fact	that	we	can	operate with	these	signs	(von	Helmholtz	1867,	
443).	 Ethics	 can	 even	 be	 interpreted	 according	 to	 this	 scheme:	 maxims	 and	
imperatives	are	statements	concerning	the	“right”	form	of	acting,	and	the	real	
actions	can	be	viewed	as	“means”	to	reach	the	symbolical	status	of	the	idea	of	
Good,	in	which	every	influence	of	the	biological	impulse	has	been	completely	
transfigured.	
2. The Threshold-Argument and the Definition of Man as “Ani-
mal Symbolicum”
Cassirer’s	“animal symbolicum”	clearly	has	a	continuous	relationship	with	the	
classic	 philosophical	 definition	 of	 “animal rationale”.	 From	 a	 logical	 point	 of	
view,	 both	 the	 arguments	 are	 based	 on	 the	 possibility	 of	 individuating	 a	
threshold	between	what	is	still	animal	and	the	specification	of	the	human	form	
of	the	living1.	The	threshold-argument	is	typical	of	the	philosophical	tradition	
and	mainly	of	the	philosophical	anthropology	(Scheler,	Plessner,	Gehlen);	this	
implies	that	the	main	task	of	the	theory	becomes	that	of	describing	the	rules	
and	the	criteria	according	to	which	a	well-defined	border	can	be	found.	There	
is	 a	 basic	 form	 of	 life	 corresponding	 to	 the	 position	 of	 man,	 whose	 access	 is	
denied	 to	 all	 other	 forms	 of	 living	 beings.	 Furthermore,	 both	 the	 definitions	
imply	an	anthropocentric	position,	even	though	the	“animal symbolicum”	does	
not	share	the	metaphysical	implications	of	the	“animal rationale”	and	appears	
to	 be	 scientifically	 proved2:	 the	 symbolic	 tension	 as	 constitutive	 element	 of	
1	On	this	classical	topic	of	the	philosophical	anthropology	(see:	Schacht	2015,	56).	
2	When	 we	 are	 saying	 “scientifically	 proved”,	 we	 mean	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 definition	 of	
“animal symbolicum”	is	argued	moving	from	the	scientific	context.	Hence	the	structure	
of	the	argument	is	strictly	phenomenological:	the	starting	point	is	the	analysis	of	the	
animal	 behaviour	 and	 language,	 about	 which	 no	 symbolical	 dimension	 seems	 to	 be	
upheld.	This	can	be	explained	by	recalling	the	incapacity	of	animals	to	withhold	their	
relationship	 to	 environment,	 and	 the	 assumption	 that	 their	 language	 does	 not	 over-
come	the	expressive	level.	On	the	contrary,	the	experimental	data	especially	concern-
ing	the	patological	conscience	do	show	how	the	characteristic	aspect	of	human	intelli-
gence	consist	of	the	symbolic	organization	of	reality.	Aphasic	patients	are	in	fact	una-
ble	to	solve	abstract	problems	(for	instance	the	subsumption	of	the	different	tonalities	
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human	 identity	 is	 indeed	 derived	 from	 a	 precise	 comparison	 with	 modern	
biology	and	psychology,	especially	with	Jakob	von	Uexküll	and	Wolfgang	Köh-
ler,	 and	 with	 neurophysiology,	 considering	 the	 intellectual	 relationship	 that	
Cassirer	had	with	Kurt	Goldstein.	
3. Metaphysical Biology or Biological Metaphysics? 
	
In	Cassirer’s	anthropology,	the	scientific	basis	of	the	definition	of	“animal sym-
bolicum”	 is	 particularly	 clear.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 this	 approach	 appears	 to	 be	
conditioned	by	the	transcendental	point	of	view.	According	to	Cassirer’s	view,	
life	is	an	immediate	whole,	where	man’s	activity	is	characterized	by	shaping	a	
transcendent	 level	 into	 the	 immanence	 of	 life	 –	 on	 the	 latter	 point	 Cassirer	
himself	 quotes	 Simmel	 (1922,	 13).	 This	 kind	 of	 representation	 prevents	 us	
from	strictly	overcoming	phenomenal	experience,	but	it	also	allows	us	to	take	
into	 account	 the	 specific	 activity	 of	 man	 in	 the	 realm	 of	 nature:	 as	 a	 conse-
quence,	 man	 is	 that	 living	 being	 deep-rooted	 into	 his	 biology,	 but	 capable	 of	
reversing	this	trend	through	the	use	of	the	symbolic	faculty.	
As	a	consequence,	it	is	not	clear	if	it	is	better	to	talk	of	a	“metaphysical	biolo-
gy”	or	of	a	“biological	metaphysics”.	In	his	posthumous	project	of	a	metaphys-
ics	 of	 symbolic	 forms,	 the	 distinction	 between	 «Geist»	und	 «Leben»	 seems	to	
speak	in	favour	of	a	separation	between	metaphysics	and	biology,	but	the	phe-
nomenological	 approach	 heads	 in	 a	 different	 direction	 (Itzkoff	 1971,	 175).	
Geist means,	in	fact,	not	a	higher	dimension	than	the	immediateness	of	Leben,	
but	rather	a	different	consciousness	of	the	unity	of	life	(Sissel	Hoel	2012,	73):	
The	essence	of	 the	 fully	concrete	 life	“is	(not	something	which	 is	
added	 to	 its	 own	 being,	 but	 something	 building	 its	 own	 being);	
that	transcendence	is	immanent	to	it”.	In	this	inner	and	necessary	
duality,	 life	 appears	 not	 solely	 as	 the	 primitive	 source	 of	 spirit,	
but	also	as	its	archetype	and	prototype.	Indeed,	the	same duplici-
ty	is	present	in	a	renewed	and	empowered	form	into	the	being	of	
spirit.	The	growth	and	empowerment	means	that	spirit	not	simp-
ly	has	this	duplicity	in	itself	as	a	part,	but	it	knows of	it	too	(Cassi-
rer	2003,	11).	
Hence,	 we	 can	 argue	 that	 Cassirer’s	 point	 of	 view	 can	 be	 interpreted	 in	 the	
light	 of	 a	 biological	 metaphysics3,	 viz.	 by	 bearing	 in	 mind	 the	 unity	 and	
																																																																																																																																																											
of	green	under	the	general	concept	of	the	green	colour),	and	this	seems	to	suggest	that	
the	decisive	faculty	of	humand	mind	lies	in	the	capacity	of	the	abstract	and	symbolical	
organization	of	reality	(see	Cassirer	1944,	44-86;	Cassirer	1957,	205-278).	
3	Metaphysical	biology	seems	on	the	contrary	to	be	moving	in	the	opposite	direction.	
They	 both	 underline	 the	 close	 relationship	 between	 the	 general	 anthropological	
statements	and	their	scientific	origin,	but	in	the	case	of	palaeontology	the	tendency	is	
to	uphold,	despite	a	clear	upturning,	the	biological	roots	of	every	definition.	Thus,	one	
can	say	that	a	biological	metaphysics	seeks	for	a	scientific	foundation	of	its	metaphysi-
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uniqueness	 of	 life,	 but	 showing	 how	 man’s	 activity	 opens	 up	 a	 space	 for	 the	
determination	 of	 a	 transcendent	 window,	 within	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 immanent	
living	(Sissel	Hoel	2012,	78;	86–89;	Renz	2002,	266-272).	Accordingly,	“spirit”	
is	the	name	describing	the	consciousness	of	the	mediated	character	of	the	im-
manence	 of	 life,	 and	 can	 be	 solely	 known	 through	 its	 objective	 forms,	 viz.	
through	the	symbolic	forms	(Bayer	2001,	44-45).	The	compatibility	of	such	a	
vision	with	the	results	of	science	can	be	sustained	as	well	by	recalling	the	spe-
cific	nature	of	the	principle	of	“finality”	within	biological	sciences,	that	Cassi-
rer,	 following	 Kant’s	 Kritik der Urteilskraft,	 interpreted	 as	 a	 maxim	 and	 as	 a	
heuristic	principle:	from	this	point	of	view,	the	unity	of	life,	which	is	the	unity	
of	nature,	solely	means	a	functional	scheme	introduced	by	natural	researchers	
in	their	work,	but	not	a	substantial	quality	of	nature	or	of	being	itself	(Cassirer	
1950,	118-216). 
4. The Difference Between “Rational” and “Symbolic” and the 
Meta-Environmental Character of Human Acting 
	
At	 this	 stage	 of	 argumentation	 we	 must	 point	 out	 a	 difference	 running	 be-
tween	 the	 concept	 of	 “rational”	 and	 that	 of	 “symbolic”,	 as	 regard	 Cassirer’s	
thought	 as	 well	 as	 for	 the	 philosophical	 anthropology	 in	 general.	 On	 the	one	
hand,	 the	confrontation	with	ancient	metaphysics	ends	with	 the	substitution	
of	the	universally	rational	attribute	with	its	specification	as	symbolical	activity.	
Every	rational	move	is	as	such	symbolic,	because	it	presupposes	the	capacity,	
for	man,	of	overcoming	the	immediate	environment,	to	assume	a	transcendent	
position	 in	 the	 continuity	 of	 the	 living.	 What	 is	 rational	 is	 not	 a	 particular	
product	or	even	a	universal	shape	of	logos (speech,	thought	etc.),	but	 logos in	
its	own	activity.	On	the	other	hand,	it	 is	clear	that	Cassirer	wanted	to	 lay	the	
foundations	 of	 a	 functional	 metaphysics,	 according	 to	 which	 the	 unity	 of	 the	
whole	is	not	rejected	as	such,	but	transcendence	itself	is	represented	as	well	as	
a	constitutive	part	of	the	unity	of	being.	In	order	to	do	that,	there	is	only	the	
way	mentioned	above:	setting	up	the	pure	activity	of	thought	as	the	very	sense	
of	reason.	This	framework	immediately	brings	us	to	the	question	of	technolo-
gy.	
In	its	fundamental	meaning	technology	is	for	sure	activity.	As	a	consequence,	a	
theory	of	technology	should	provide	a	general	account	of	the	different	forms	of	
the	acting.	But	technology	itself	might	be	viewed	as	the	peculiar	form	of	intel-
ligence	 gained	 by	 man	 over	 the	 course	 of	 history.	 Leroi-Gourhan’s	 work	 has	
been	seminal	 in	that	regard,	and	has	showed	how	the	technological	ability	 is	
biologically	inherent	to	man.	In	his	account,	the	development	of	the	technolog-
ical	capacity	depends	on	a	whole	anatomic	 framework,	which	represents	 the	
																																																																																																																																																											
cal	content,	whereas	a	metaphysical	biology	tries	to	show	how	the	metaphysical	con-
tent	can	be	genealogically	derived	from	science	itself.	
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basic	set	of	conditions	of	human	species.	The	transcendental	definition	of	man	
gained	 by	 palaeontology	 is	 then	 different	 from	 the	 classically	 philosophical	
one,	 since	 the	 conditions	 of	 possibility	 are	 not	 merely	 logic,	 but	 it	 generally	
complies	 with	 the	 higher	 principles	 of	 transcendental	 mentality.	 Still,	 this	 is	
not	the	point;	indeed,	the	palaeontological	interpretation	gives	us	new	tools	to	
better	reconsider	Cassirer’s	definition.	
In	 the	spirit	of	 transcendental	mentality,	 the	confrontation	with	science	 is	 in	
fact	 unavoidable:	 without	 a	 scientific	 reference,	 philosophical	 statements	
could	uniquely	be	meta-empirical.	This	means	that	they	would	say	nothing	of	
experience	–	as	is	clear,	this	status	pertains	to	a priori forms	or	concepts,	but	
the	rest	of	the	concepts	have	to	be	linked	to	experience	(Kant,	KrV,	B75-A48).	
In	order	to	make	of	the	“animal symbolicum”	a	concept	with	an	empirical	con-
tent,	we	must	then	seek	for	a	scientific	grounding,	capable	of	providing	an	em-
pirical	confirmation	of	the	logical	task	of	that	concept.	
As	stated	above,	the	comparison	of	the	philosophical	position	to	palaeontology	
allows	 us	 to	 address	 this	 question.	 From	 Cassirer’s	 point	 of	 view,	 symbolic	
activity	is	the	capacity	of	man	of	transcending	the	mono-dimensionality	of	the	
natural	state:	animals	and	aphasic	subjects	are	not	able	to	solve	puzzling	ques-
tions,	which	would	need	of	the	help	of	an	“external”	element.	To	reach	the	so-
lution	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 problems,	 mind	 should	 be	 supported	 by	 the	 faculty	 of	
thinking	beyond	the	immediate	environment.	Symbolic	thinking	is	then	meta-
environmental	thinking	(Cassirer	1944,	42-79;	Cassirer	1957,	205-278).	This	
character	of	human	activity	is	confirmed	by	the	palaeontological	analysis:	the	
succession	of	 the	evolutionary	stages	of	man	seems	to	validate	 	 the	vision	of	
the	 symbolic	 activity	 as	characterizing	 aspect	 of	 human	 acting	 (Itzkoff	 1971,	
174–175).	
5. The Rise of the Question of Technology: Symbolics4 of the 
Technical Gesture 
	
According	to	Leroi-Gourhan,	there	are	three	basic	elements	to	define	mankind:	
1)	erect	posture;	2)	diminution	of	prognathism	and	spreading	of	 the	cortical	
fan;	3)	freedom	of	the	hand	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	18-24).	We	must	obviously	
focus	on	point	(3).	The	assumption	of	 the	standing	position,	acts	on	the	gen-
eral	organization	of	the	skeleton,	and	puts	the	hand	in	a	significantly	renewed	
place	within	biological	evolution.	First	of	all,	the	freedom	of	the	hand	implies	
the	 liberation	 from	 all	 those	 biological	 tasks	 accomplished	 by	 paws	 in	 other	
animals.	 This	 notion	of	 “liberation”,	 which	 seems	 to	 share	 an	 important	 con-
cordance	with	Gehlen’s	Entlastung (Gehlen	1988,	54-65),	means	that	the	func-
tion	 of	 the	 human	 hand	 is	 not	 solely	 connected	 to	 biological	 needs,	 such	 as	
																																																													
4	I	use	the	term	“symbolics”	in	the	same	way	according	to	which	we	speak	of	semiotics,	
logics	or	mathematics.	
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eating,	predation,	walking	etc.	It	is	as	though	the	evolution	of	man	set	up	the	
conditions	of	possibility	to	individuate	a	field	of	transcendence	within	the	im-
manent	living	activity	of	man,	conceived	as	biological	being,	through	this	pecu-
liar	isolation	of	the	hand.	Freed	from	the	ground	–	from	his	belonging	to	Earth	
–	and	from	its	biological	chains,	a	new	kind	of	acting	becomes	available	to	the	
hand ,	which	means	above	all:	freedom	from	biology.	Accordingly,	we	have	the	
two	stages	of	 the	whole	process:	 i)	 the	biological	 liberation;	 ii)	and	the	 free-
dom	from	biology.	 It	 is	 important	to	stress	the	difference	between	these	mo-
ments:	on	the	one	hand,	the	biological	liberation	only	means	that	a	first	grade	
of	independence	is	already	realized	within	the	biological	structure;	on	the	oth-
er	 hand,	 the	 freedom	 of	 the	 hand	 entails	 the	 liberation	 of	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	
gesture,	 having	 no	 resemblance	 with	 the	 animal	 world,	 and	 whose	 conse-
quences	are	far	from	being	clear	in	these	first	steps.	
This	 authentically	 biological	 foundation	 of	 culture	 as	 natural	 dimension	 of	
humanity	gives	us	the	starting	point	to	envisage	a	general	theory	of	symbolic	
activity	as	 characterizing	element	of	humanity.	Technology	might	 then	be	 in-
terpreted	as	another	face	of	the	same	symbolic	coin.	The	technological	activity	
is	that	specific	form	of	acting	embodied	in	a	freed	hand,	whose	symbolic	mean-
ing	consists	of	 the	 liberation	of	 the	human	gesture	from	the	biological	envel-
opment	of	man’s	body.	Furthermore,	technology	promptly	compels	us	to	think	
in	symbolic	terms.	The	fabrication	of	a	tool	is	 indeed	directly	connected	with	
the	 capacity	 of	 solving	 problems	 in	 a	 meta-environmental	 context;	 to	 con-
sciously	build	a	chopper	as	weapon,	we	are	obliged	to	go	beyond	the	presence	
of	the	stone,	since	it	is	necessary	to	presuppose	both	a	scope	and	a	paradigm	
of	the	object	we	are	going	to	construct.	As	a	consequence,	the	biological	free-
dom	of	 the	hand	sets	out	 the	conditions	of	 the	 technological	activity,	but	 the	
technological	activity	is	basically	symbolical,	implying	the	meta-environmental	
element.	 This	 meta-environmental	 element	 is	 actually	 original,	 even	 though	
technological	 actions	 seem	 to	 be	 firstly	 related	 to	 matter.	 The	 circumstance	
that	the	different	technological	activities	are	organized	under	the	primacy	of	a	
determined	material	element,	such	as	water,	fire	etc.	(Leroi-Gourhan	1971,	9-
22),	does	not	change	the	fact	that	technology	is	already	acting5.	
In	 turn,	 the	 rise	 of	 rationality	 as	 distinctive	 attribute	 of	 man	 is	 in	 any	 case	
strictly	 connected	 to	 the	 anatomical	 evolution,	 since	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	
skeleton	to	the	erect	posture	causes	modifications	in	the	conformation	of	the	
skull.	 The	 spreading	 of	 the	 cortical	 fan	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	
human	 brain	 both	 to	 the	 renewed	 physiognomy	 of	 the	 skull	 and	 to	 the	 new	
																																																													
5	The	mutual	belonging	of	matter	and	spirit	has	been	recently	upheld	by	Coccia:	“It	is	
in	the	stones,	indeed,	that	the	human	intelligence	has	come	out	from	the	space	of	inte-
riority,	to	incarnate	itself	in	the	world	of	things.	Used,	worked	or	sculpted,	stone	is	the	
primordial	object,	 the	most	ancient	vehicle	of	the	human	spirit,	 the	first	 form	of	cul-
ture”	(Coccia	2014,	17),	who	besides	explicitly	quotes	Leroi-Gourhan	in	a	footnote	(see	
1971,	115).			
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technological	 possibilities:	 brain	 becomes	 bigger,	 and	 the	 neurological	 net-
work	structures	itself	according	to	the	implications	of	a	freed	hand.	The	whole	
structure	then	predisposes	man’s	face	to	the	birth	and	the	use	of	language.	
	 From	this	point	of	view,	one	can	say	that	technology	and	language	are	
the	two	inextricable	aspects	of	a	human	symbolic	rationality.	In	fact,	we	must	
bear	in	mind	that	not	solely	language	is	symbolic,	but	also	that	the	technologi-
cal	activity	has	a	symbolic	meaning:	human	acting	is	both	technological	–	be-
cause	the	freed	hand	is	capable	of	creating	and	using	tools	–	and	symbolical	–	
the	production	of	tools	implies	the	meta-environmental	and	paradigmatic	ca-
pacity.	This	means	that	a	history	of	 technology	is	at	the	same	time	history	of	
reason,	and	that	a	genealogy	of	language	is	a	direct	consequence	of	an	enquiry	
upon	technology	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	112-116).	
6. Biology of Society and Philosophy of Culture 
	
Leroi-Gourhan’s	anthropology	must	be	interpreted	in	the	light	of	a	metaphysi-
cal	 biology,	 but	 the	 peculiar	 upturning	 originated	 by	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 human	
consociations	 confirms	 the	 exceptional	 character	 of	 human	 culture:	 here	 the	
rhythms	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 humanity	 as	 phylum have	 been	 overcome	 by	 an	
autonomous	 orientation.	 The	 idea	 of	 biology	 of	 technology	 entails	 a	 double	
level	of	liberation	(nature-society-culture),	since	biology	of	society	compels	us	
to	 recognize	 that	 the	 evolution	 of	 human	 societies	 follow	 a	 specific	 rhythm,	
which	is	at	the	same	time	a	reflection	and	an	independent	reconfiguration	of	
biological	 evolution.	 The	 problem	 concerns	 how	 much	 of	 the	 biological	
rhythms	 penetrates	 into	 the	 realm	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	 societies,	 considering	
that	the	analysis	of	technology	shows	the	possibility	of	individuating	an	evolu-
tionary	 progress	 which	 is	 similar	 to	 the	 biological	 evolution6.	 Leroi-Gourhan	
introduces	 the	 question	of	 biology	 of	 society	 and	of	 biology	 of	 technology	 in	
the	fifth	chapter	of	Technics and Language (Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	145-147).	
In	order	to	find	a	definition	of	biology	of	society	and	of	biology	of	technology,	
we	must	 take	 into	account	two	excerpts	of	Memory and Rhythms:	 i)	 “This	en-
meshing	of	 tools	and	gestures	 in	organs	extraneous	to	the	human	has	all	 the	
characteristics	 of	 biological	 evolution	 because,	 like	 cerebral	 evolution,	 it	 de-
velops	 in	 time	 through	 the	 addition	 of	 elements	 that	 improve	 the	 operation	
process	 without	 eliminating	 one	 another”	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 II,	 242);	 ii)	
“Generally	regarded	as	historical	phenomena	of	technical	significance,	the	in-
vention	of	the	four-wheeled	carriage,	the	plough,	the	windmill,	the	sailing	ship,	
must	also	be	viewed	as	biological	ones	–	as	mutations	of	that	external	organ-
ism	which,	in	the	human,	substitutes	itself	for	the	physiological	body”	(Leroi-
Gourhan	1993,	II,	246).	I	briefly	dealt	with	the	question,	to	underline	how	the	
																																																													
6	Audouze	has	noticed	that	this	inner	tension	proper	to	technology	might	have	a	link	to	
Bergson’s	élan vital (Audouze	2002,	293-294).	
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different	liberations	realized	through	the	broadening	of	the	technological	ges-
ture	 lead	 us	 to	 the	 recognition	 of	 a	 specific	 phenomenon	 called	 “exterioriza-
tion”:	“We	saw	earlier	that	in	humans,	the	mobility	of	tools	and	language	has	
determined	the	exteriorization	of	operational	programs	related	to	the	survival	
of	the	group”	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	II, 238).	“Exteriorization”	is	another	trace	
of	 the	 symbolical	 attitude	 of	 the	 technological	 gesture:	 “This	 detachment,	
which	expresses	 itself	 in	the	separation	between	tool	and	hand	and	between	
word	and	object,	is	also	reflected	in	the	distance	society	creates	between	itself	
and	the	zoological	group.	The	whole	of	our	evolution	has	been	oriented	toward	
placing	outside	ourselves	what	in	the	rest	of	the	animal	world	is	achieved	in-
side by	 species	 adaptation”	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 II,	 235).	 One	 can	 observe	
this	passage	in	Cassirer	too,	since	the	anthropological	turn	and	the	question	of	
the	 phenomenology	 of	 life	 brings	 to	 a	 reconsideration	 of	 the	 three-way	 divi-
sion	 of	 Philosophie der symbolischen Formen:	 Ausdruck (expression), Darstel-
lung (representation)	and	reine Bedeutung (pure	meaning),	in	favour	of	a	func-
tional	 dialectics	 of	 Ausdruck (Plümacher	 1996,	 136-138;	 Möckel	 2005,	 340-
343).	
Nevertheless,	human	intelligence	implies	a	third	 level	of	emancipation	acting	
on	 the	 consolidation	 of	 the	 mechanical	 operational	 sequences:	 the	 organiza-
tion	 of	 brain	 is	 so	 complex,	 to	 the	 point	 that	 the	 selection	 and	 the	 choice	
among	these	sequences	has	reached	a	high	degree	of	freedom	in	respect	both	
of	the	phyletic	heritage	and	of	the	social	transmission	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	
145-147;	 II,	 219-236).	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 one	 can	 undoubtedly	 affirm	
that	the	very	realm	of	humanity	is	the	world	of	culture	(Cassirer	1944,	87-96;	
Bayer	2001,	45-46).	
7. The Ontological Grounding of Future 
	
The	 settlement	 of	 a	 symbolics	 of	 the	 technical	 gesture	 leaves	 room	 for	 a	
chronological	analysis	of	human	acting.	Indeed,	the	meta-environmental	char-
acter	of	man’s	activity	implies	a	peculiar	orientation	of	every	gesture	toward	
what	 is	 not	 immediately	 present.	 Human	 activity	 always	 recalls	 something	
which	is	not	“on	hand”.	
It	 is	worthwhile	 to	study	this	 situation	according	to	 the	 threshold-argument.	
Animal	acting	is	of	course	carried	out	by	something	which	is	not	present,	and	
that	we	may	identify	as	an	acquired	experience:	for	instance,	the	disputes	for	
the	territory	are	regulated	by	a	consolidated	language,	which	is	solely	not	ef-
fect	of	the	instincts.	The	same	word	“instinct”	is	actually	misleading:	Cassirer	
was	perfectly	aware	of	animal	intelligence	(Cassirer	1944,	59-60),	and	accord-
ing	to	Leroi-Gourhan	the	consolidation	of	the	operational	memory	must	imply	
the	recognition	of	a	peculiar	form	of	intelligence	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	II,	230-
234).	Since	it	rises	up	out	the	codification	of	some	mechanical	operations,	“in-
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stinct”	is	already	“intelligence”.	There	must	be	a	sort	of	transmission	between	
the	different	generations,	so	that	one	can	say	that	the	memory	of	operational	
sequences	is	a	shared	characteristic	of	men	and	animals.	However,	it	must	be	
pointed	 out	 that	 the	 distinctive	 attribute	 of	 man’s	 memory	 is	 its	 degree	 of	
freedom	in	the	choice	of	the	different	sequences,	as	well	as	the	refinement	of	a	
specific	form	of	language	overcoming	the	mere	expression	of	needs	or	feeling	
(Cassirer	1944,	44-62;	Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	II,	221-227;	236-237).	Indeed,	the	
invention	of	words	as	stable	support	of	the	meaning	of	actions	deals	the	cards	
afresh.	The	sphere	of	meaning	is,	within	human	context,	crystallized	through	
the	 possibility	 of	 making	 clear	 and	 unambiguous	 references	 to	 non-present	
contents,	whereas	the	meaning	of	an	animal	action	is	deep-rooted	in	the	pre-
sent	to	which	it	belongs.	The	creation	of	stable	signs	involves	the	rise	of	a	spe-
cific	form	of	manipulation.	The	vocal	expression	of	an	inner	content	cannot	be	
available	 for	 another	 animal	 after	 its	 actual	 use;	 this	 happens	 because	 the	
communicative	intention	ceases	with	the	action	itself,	insofar	as	it	has	reached	
its	goal	of	expressing	feelings	of	 fear,	domination	etc.7;	simply	put,	an	animal	
sign	cannot	be	used	by	another	animal	in	a	successive	moment	as	it	were	the	
same	sign,	and	it	will	never	become	a	word.	
From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 rise	 of	 the	 chronological	 determination	 of	 man	
appears	 to	 be	 clearly	 oriented	 toward	 the	 future.	 This	 spreading	 is	 directly	
connected	to	the	technological	manipulation	of	signs,	because,	as	we	have	al-
ready	seen,	 the	creation	of	signs	implies	their	constant	availability.	Futuristic	
dimension,	meta-environmental	 tension,	 technology	and	symbolic	 faculty	are	
solely	four	aspects	of	the	same	process.	
Hence,	the	future	availability	of	signs	is	the	characterizing	element	of	the	hu-
man	symbolic	acting.	The	interrelation	of	the	symbolic	and	of	the	technologi-
cal	dimension	is	here	unavoidable,	and	the	definition	of	a	basic	point	of	view	
by	means	of	which	solving	the	question	of	human	acting	could	not	leave	aside	
this	element.	
In	short,	we	have	at	least	three	reasons	according	to	which	the	symbolicity	of	
the	technical	gesture	can	be	argued	for:	
	
i)	The	fact	that	technological	capacity	rises	up	as	a	consequence	of	the	biologi-
cal	 freedom	 of	 the	 human	 hand	 seems	 to	 recall	 the	 meta-environmental	 ele-
ment	which	is	peculiar	to	the	definition	of	the	symbolical	worth	of	human	act-
ing;	from	this	point	of	view,	we	may	also	say	that	there	are	not	two	different	
sorts	of	actions,	but	rather	a	unique	form	of	activity	which	can	be	actualized	
																																																													
7	Aristotle	himself,	defining	man	as	the	only	living	being	having	logos,	was	fully	aware	
of	the	communicative	capacity	of	animals:	the	difference	between	men	and	animals	is	
not	 that	 of	 having	 language,	 if	 language	 is	 the	 capacity	 of	 communicating	 feelings	
(aisthēsis)	through	voice	(phōnē),	but	rather	the	possibility	of	discussing	of	Good	and	
Evil,	of	what	is	useful	or	unuseful	through	language.	From	this	point	of	view,	it	is	clear	
that	human	language	must	be	represented	as	a	radically	different	form	from	a	generic	
shape	of	emotional	expressivity	pertaining	to	animals	too	(Pol.	I,	1253a1-18).	
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through	these	two	basic	configurations	(the	technological	action	and	the	sym-
bolical	one).	This	can	be	confirmed	by	the	addition	of	the	esthetical	faculty	as	a	
third	 specific	 form	 of	 human	 acting.	 Nevertheless,	 as	 I	 have	 already	 pointed	
out,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 hold	 the	 distinction	 between	 biological	 liberation	 and	
freedom	 from	 biology:	 the	 first	 is	 the	 result	 of	 a	 bio-mechanical	 process,	
whereas	the	latter	is	the	consequence	of	this	process.	The	step	made	from	the	
first	 stage	 to	 the	 second	 one	 is	 the	 invention	 of	 gestures,	 viz.	 the	 aesthetical	
development	of	motility.	Between	the	two	dimensions,	we	also	find	the	rise	of	
society.	
	
ii)	 The	 fabrication	 of	 artefacts	 presupposes	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 paradigmatic	
model	of	 the	acting.	Philosophy	has	broadly	focussed	on	this	topic,	as	Plato’s	
theory	of	ideas	clearly	shows.	The	technological	relationship	running	between	
sensitive	beings	and	ideas	 is	explained	through	the	demiurgic	metaphor,	and	
the	 same	 definition	 of	 natural	 being	 is	 somehow	 arguable	 only	 according	 to	
these	technical	terms.	Knowledge	is	genealogically	linked	to	the	technological	
manipulation,	 since	 beings	 solely	 become	 knowable	 within	 the	 reference	 of	
thing	 to	 that	 idea	 working	 as	 paradigm.	 The	 knowability	 function	 is	 imple-
mented	by	demiurge’s	action,	which	puts	into	things	the	reference	to	an	ideal	
meaning,	and	made	them	signs	of	ideas	–	according	to	Plato’s	Timaeus,	things	
are	ta dia nou dedēmiourgēmena (Tim. 47e4).	The	production	and	the	creation	
of	 a	 thing	 as	 sign8	is	 of	 course	 metaphoric,	 but	 it	 represents	 the	 final	 philo-
sophical	transposition	of	the	technical	gesture.	However,	the	shape	of	the	par-
adigmatic	 structure	 is	crucial	 as	 well.	 It	 is	 not	 by	chance	 that	 Leroi-Gourhan	
depicts	the	question	of	technology	through	the	reference	to	the	lithic	industry,	
and	 that	 the	 point	 of	 divergence	 between	 human	 technology	 and	 a	 generic	
acting	through	means	is	represented	by	the	conscious	creation,	viz.	by	the	ca-
pacity	of	man	of	directing	the	fabrication	process	(see	also	Aristotle’s	Physics,	
e.g.	194b7-8).	Hence,	we	speak	of	technological	action	when	we	can	individu-
ate	a	process	according	to	which	a	thing	is	created	under	the	work	of	a	specific	
model,	 whose	 function	 corresponds	 to	 a	 certain	 network	 of	 impulses	 and	
goals.	Technological	acting	is	constitutionally	symbolic,	because	its	structure	is	
strictly	paradigmatic	(de	Villers	2007,	97-98).	
	
iii)	In	human	kind	there	is	a	precise	relationship	face-hand,	and	the	genealogy	
of	language	solely	becomes	possible	under	the	star	of	a	genealogy	of	technolo-
gy.	There	is	a	special	agreement	between	the	development	of	the	technological	
faculty	 and	 the	 linguistic	 one,	 until	 the	 point	 that	 the	 parallelism	 tool-word	
actually	 becomes	 dominant	 in	 the	 description	 of	 human	 evolution.	 Mutatis 
mutandis,	words	behave	in	the	same	way	as	tools	do	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	I,	
																																																													
8	The	acknowledgment	of	this	character	of	thing	has	been	always	figured	out	over	the	
history	of	idealism.	It	is	sufficient	here	to	remind	Plato’s	account,	according	to	which	
thing	is	mē on,	inasmuch	as	it	is	sign	of	the	ontōs on of	an	idea.	
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34-36):	 they	 are	 the	 instruments	 of	 the	 symbolic	 manipulation	 of	 reality.	
Words	allow	man	to	free	himself	from	the	environmental	context,	because	they	
allude	to	the	possibility	of	abstract	meanings,	and	can	be	considered	valid	not	
only	 within	 the	 situation	 into	 which	 they	 are	 arisen	 and	 used,	 but	 they	 are	
henceforward	 available	 to	 all	 those	 who	 will	 be	 able	 to	 put	 that	 use	 in	 their	
own	hands.	Moreover,	the	consolidation	of	a	vocal	signal	in	an	objective	sign	is	
accompanied	 by	 the	 emerging	 of	 a	 specific	 question	 on	 the	 relationship	 of	
signs	between	each	other.	 It	 is	possible	to	very	soon	set	up	the	question	of	a	
technological	theory	of	the	use	of	signs,	according	to	which	words	are	indeed	
nothing	but	tools.	This	conception	had	great	luck	in	the	history	of	philosophy,	
beginning	 from	 Plato	 (Crat. 388b	 and	 ff.),	 and	 the	 history	 of	 idealism	 has	
shown	its	importance	especially	in	Leibniz’	idea	of	a	Characteristica universalis 
(Cassirer	1998,	124-125).	
	
The	unavailability	of	signs	determines	the	chronological	dimension	of	human	
acting.	 This	 dimension	 is	 literally	 utopian,	 since	 man	 is	 constantly	 projected	
beyond	his	own	environment9.	In	the	first	stages	of	this	process,	the	projection	
does	 not	 reach	 a	 specific	 social	 meaning	 and	 still	 less	 the	 realm	 of	 ethics,	
which	 is	 only	 a	 very	 late	 product	 of	 human	 evolution	 and	 culture10,	 but	 one	
may	 conjectures	 that	 this	 utopian	 tension	 has	 been	 already	 prepared	 within	
the	biological	context.	
Not	 only	 Cassirer’s	 An Essay on Man is	 very	 clear	 on	 the	 utopian	 tension	 of	
humanity	towards	future,	but	his	whole	ontology	confirms	this	idea.	Cassirer’s	
																																																													
9	It	must	be	said	that	in	the	modern	era	of	technology,	the	meta-environmental	charac-
ter	will	be	contrasted	by	the	rise	of	a	specific	form	of	tension,	flowing	in	the	opposit	
direction	 to	 meta-environmentality,	 which	can	be	 called	“neo-environmentality”.	 It	 is	
related	 to	 the	 hypostatization	of	 the	counter-movement	pertaining	 the	 technical	act-
ing:	 once	 man	 is	 distanciated	 from	 his	 environment,	 the	 technical	 gesture	 tends	 to	
compensate	the	hiatus	between	man	and	environment,	to	the	point	that	man’s	world,	
which	ought	to	be	in	principle	symbolic,	can	be	once	again	viewed	as	a	sort	of	a	“neo-
environment”.	It	is	quite	reasonable:	i)	the	biological	liberation	implies	the	freedom	of	
the	 hand,	 which	 means	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 technological	 acting;	 ii)	 this	 acting	 is	
symbolic	 since	 it	 is	 based	 on	 the	 paradigmatic	 model;	 iii)	 it	 enables	 a	 long	 chain	 of	
exteriorizations;	 iv)there	 we	 find	 the	 peculiar	 separation	 man-environment,	 but	 the	
symbolic	 character	 of	 the	 technological	 gesture	 paradoxically	 implies	 a	 refill	 of	 that	
distance	 (Cera	 2013,	 181-192),	 since	 the	 tool	 is	 used	 to	 remedy	 a	 biological	 lack;	v)	
machines	are	the	ultimate	expression	of	this	development,	because	they	allow	a	defini-
tive	domination	onto	what	is	supposed	to	be	absolutely	far	from	man.	
10	The	 main	 difference	 between	 Cassirer	 and	 Leroi-Gourhan	 might	 be	 found	 in	 the	
worth	given	to	the	final	goal	of	their	genealogies.	Indeed,	the	ethical	man	has	a	spiritu-
al	primacy	in	Cassirer’s	mind,	and	becomes	the	truly	man,	since	it	reaches	the	realm	of	
Geist and	 his	 transcendent	 disposition (Cassirer	 2004,	 237-255;	 Renz	 2002,	 92-106;	
Bermes	2012,	593-598);	according	to	Leroi-Gourhan,	instead,	the	idea	that	the	ethical	
man	 descends	 from	 his	 twofold	 biological	 roots	 (both	 from	 anatomical	 biology	 and	
from	biology	of	society)	seems	to	be	always	predominant.	
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ontology	 is	 an	 ontology	 of	 what	 is	 not	 present,	 since	 the	 beable-content11	is	
evidently	defined	as	a	product	of	reason	in	its	transcendental	and	mathemati-
cal	structure.	Thinking	being	means	 to	 individuate	 the	position	of	 that	being	
among	 the	 other	 beings;	 this	 intrinsic	 mathematical	 character	 of	 knowledge	
compels	us	to	recognize	the	 functionality	of	knowledge,	and	the	 fact	 that	the	
presence	of	being	is	always	a	sort	of	logic	postulate.	The	meta-environmental	
element	is	then	present	in	the	basic	foundation	of	ontology	too.	Notwithstand-
ing,	 it	 is	 in	 An Essay on Man that	 the	 intrinsic	 tension	 toward	 the	 future	 be-
comes	 evident.	 This	 orientation	 is	 accomplished	when	 politics	 and	 ethics,	 as	
forms	of	culture,	are	definitely	sketched.	The	problem	of	moral	acting	is	based	
on	 the	 definition	 of	 previsions	 and	 rules,	 transcending	 the	 punctual	 disposi-
tion	of	experience	as	such.	This	dynamics	finally	ends	with	the	determination	
of	the	regulative	character	of	the	idea	of	Good,	which	works	as	the	polar	star	of	
the	acting,	but	which	 is	 not	reachable	at	all.	 From	 this	point	of	view,	politics	
and	ethics	could	be	solely	in	a	non-place,	because	their	real	goal	is	not	proper-
ly	available,	and	they	work	as	directional	systems	(Cassirer	1944,	84-86).	
The	real	character	of	future	is	that	of	being	unavailable:	the	tension	of	human	
acting	 is	 directed	 toward	 an	 ungraspable	 foundation	 working	 as	 criterion	 of	
activity.	Of	course,	this	is	an	already	specialized	form	of	acting,	and	it	cannot	be	
used	as	 the	 wellspring	 of	 the	 human	 activity	 as	such.	 However,	 the	 symbolic	
character	of	the	Good	can	be	interpreted	as	the	final	stage	of	a	whole	phenom-
enology,	 whose	 roots	 remount	 the	 first	 development	 of	 the	 technological	 ca-
pacity,	 through	 Neoanthropians	 and	 looking	 back	 at	 Palaeoanthropians.	 The	
meta-environmental	character	of	that	technological	gesture	sets	up	the	condi-
tions	for	the	realization	of	human	transcendence,	viz.	the	conditions	of	possi-
bility	of	the	basic	move	of	going	beyond	the	immediateness	of	experience;	the	
biological	worth	of	this	tension	is	indispensable	for	the	surviving	and	adapta-
tion	of	human	kind.	The	meaning	of	 the	human	gesture	expands	to	the	point	
that	Cassirer	can	call	the	peculiar	chronological	dimension	to	which	it	belongs:	
“symbolic future”	(Cassirer	1944,	77-79),	whereas	he	refuses	to	recognize	that	
this	symbolic	attitude	pertains	to	animal	chronological	determination:	
On	the	basis	of	this	evidence	it	seems	to	follow	that	the	anticipa-
tion	of	 future	events	and	even	 the	planning	of	 future	actions	are	
not	entirely	beyond	the	reach	of	animal	life.	But	in	human	beings	
the	 awareness	 of	 the	 future	 undergoes	 the	 same	 characteristic	
change	of	meaning	which	we	have	noted	with	regard	 to	 the	 idea	
of	the	past.	The	future	is	not	only	an	image;	it	becomes	an	“ideal”.	
[…]	 It	 is	 more	 than	 expectation;	 it	 becomes	 an	 imperative	 of	 hu-
man	life	(Cassirer	1944,	78).	
																																																													
11	The	content	 that	could	be	assumed	as	a	 potential	being	becoming	an	actual	being.	
The	term	is	taken	from	Bell’s	classic	work	on	quantum	mechanics:	“The	beables	of	the	
theory	 are	 those	 elements	 which	 might	 correspond	 to	 elements	 of	 reality,	 to	 things	
which	exist”	(Bell	2004,	174).	
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The	cultural	turn	makes	of	the	record	of	the	mechanical	operational	sequences	
a	 completely	 different	 question.	 The	 human	 acting	 is	 not	 only	 based	 on	 the	
solidification	of	a	memory	and	on	doing	the	right	choice	among	a	class	of	op-
erations,	 but	 in	 its	 cultural	 meaning	 directly	 deals	 with	 an	 utopian	 tension,	
which	 Cassirer	 manifestly	 calls	 “prophetic”.	 From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 reli-
gious	and	ethical	acting	can	be	viewed	as	the	last	stage	of	an	evolution,	which	
began	with	the	setting	of	an	operative	code.	
8. Technology, Language and Symbolic Faculty 
	
I	have	tried	to	show	the	circularity	between	technological	and	symbolic	action	
(Ruin	2012,	120–121),	and	aimed	at	endorsing	a	transcendental	foundation	of	
the	analysis	of	human	acting	–	which	I	will	explain	in	details	in	the	next	para-
graph.	 The	 comparison	 of	 the	 philosophical	 argumentation	 to	 palaeoanthro-
pology	has	provided	a	renewed	scientific	basic	for	the	philosophical	argumen-
tation,	which	tends	to	tie	the	different	aspects	of	technology,	of	social	and	cul-
tural	assets,	of	ontology	and	ethics.	Nevertheless,	 the	proposal	of	 integrating	
the	classic	definition	of	man	as	rational	being	with	the	genealogical	argument	
of	the	“technological	man”,	does	not	disprove	the	centrality	of	the	definition	of	
“animal symbolicum”.	The	symbolical	disposition	is	indeed	confirmed	by	Leroi-
Gourhan,	when	he	claims	that	the	invention	of	graphism	is	the	late	distinctive	
element	 of	 man’s	 evolution	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 187-200);	 accordingly,	 the	
definition	“animal symbolicum”	appears	to	gain	a	fascinating	solidity.	
Let	me	conclude	by	summing	up	the	content	of	a	paragraph	from	Gesture and 
Speech	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 112-116).	 It	 deals	 with	 the	 relationship	 lan-
guage-technology,	but	will	allow	us	to	point	out	once	again	the	validity	of	the	
definition	of	man	as	“animal symbolicum”	and	its	meta-environmental	tension.	
The	objective	is	to	lay	the	foundations	of	a	theory	of	acting	according	to	which	
technological	and	symbolical	actions	are	solely	two	aspects	of	 the	same	phe-
nomenon.	Considering	the	complexity	of	the	matter,	I	will	divide	the	summary	
in	three	parts.	
	
i)	Language, symbols and signs. The	first	question	to	 face	is	what	we	properly	
consider	as	“language”.	Cassirer	has	showed	that	“human	language”	is	charac-
terized	by	a	symbolic	and	meta-environmental	tension,	connected	to	the	rise	
of	the	question	of	meaning;	animals	do	have	a	specific	language,	but	its	func-
tion	 is	 solely	 that	 of	 manifesting	 interior	 feelings	 or	 needs.	 This	 emotional	
communication	 does	 not	reach	 the	 logical	 form	 and	 the	 meta-environmental	
status,	since	it	is	not	possible	to	conceive	“sign”	as	a	stable	content	to	be	used	
in	another	context.	Hence,	 the	peculiarity	of	human	language	is	 that	of	being	
based	on	the	creation	of	“symbols”	–	Cassirer	distinguishes	human	“symbols”	
from	animal	“signs”	or	“signals”	(Cassirer	1944,	47-50)–,	and	the	invention	of	
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writing	 is	 the	 natural	 and	 decisive	 evolution	 of	 the	 whole	 process.	 Indeed,	
when	men	could	only	speak,	there	was	a	strict	division	between	the	hand	and	
the	facial	pole,	despite	the	fact	that	human	language	has	been	born	in	function	
of	 the	 adaptation	 of	 the	 face	 to	 the	 anatomical	 configuration	 of	 the	 skeleton	
and	to	the	freedom	of	the	hand;	the	rise	of	writing	then	means	a	sort	of	recon-
ciliation	between	hand	and	face,	to	the	point	that	Leroi-Gourhan	clearly	claims	
that	 tools	 and	 words	 are	 the	 product	 of	 the	 same	 human	 faculty12	(Leroi-
Gourhan	1993,	113-114).	Technological	and	symbolical	actions	are	unavoida-
bly	 interconnected	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 human	 evolution,	 and	 one	 can	 say	
that	they	are	solely	two	words	for	the	same	thing.	
	
ii)	 Technology, language and symbolical tension.	 The	 relationship	 between	
technology	and	symbolics	is	so	deep	that	it	precedes	the	rise	of	language	too.	If	
one	 might	 envisage	 a	 purely	 mute	 technological	 education,	 a	 symbolization	
has	to	be	invoked	as	well,	since	the	meta-environmental	tension	constitution-
ally	belongs	to	the	technological	gesture	(considering	the	paradigmatic	mod-
el).	This	allows	us	to	conceive	the	rise	of	language	as	going	hand	in	hand	with	
the	 development	 of	 the	 technological	 gesture,	 which	 brings	 us	 to	 think	 that	
Archanthropians	 and	 Palaeoanthropians,	 until	 the	 homo sapiens,	 had	 devel-
oped	 the	 language	 they	could	 speak,	considering	their	own	technological	ex-
pertise.	The	symbolical	tension	of	language	is	the	same	as	that	animating	the	
birth	 of	 technology.	 Indeed,	 it	 is	 important	 that	 human	 language	 overcames	
the	 mere	 level	 of	 “vocal	 signals”:	 “Where	 comparative	 studies	 of	 tools	 and	
skulls	tell	us	that	the	rate	of	development	of	industry	corresponded	to	that	of	
biological	development,	language	must	have	been	very	primitive	indeed,	but	it	
undoubtedly	 amounted	 to	 more	 than	 vocal	 signals”	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	
114).	This	is	a	solid	proof	of	Cassirer’s	argumentation	on	the	specificity	of	hu-
man	language.	As	I	have	already	written	above,	the	language	of	apes	is	charac-
terized	by	the	fact	that	communication	ceases	with	the	situation	within	which	
the	“signal”	has	been	created;	this	also	means	that	it	is	not	available	for	future	
operations,	and	that	it	is	not	a	sign	as	such:	
The	characteristic	 trait	of	 the	 “language”	and	“techniques”	of	 the	
great	apes	is	that	they	are	resorted	to	spontaneously	in	response	
to	an	external	stimulus	and	are	just	as	spontaneously	abandoned,	
or	 fail	 to	 appear,	 if	 the	 material	 situation	 triggering	 them	 ceases	
to	 exist	 or	 does	 not	 occur.	 The	 making	 and	 using	 of	 choppers	 or	
bifaces	must	be	ascribed	to	a	very	different	mechanism	since	the	
operations	 involved	 in	making	a	tool	anticipate	the	occasions	for	
its	use	and	the	tool	is	preserved	to	be	used	on	later	occasions.	The	
same	 is	 true	of	 the	difference	between	signal	and	 word,	 the	per-
manence	of	a	concept	being	comparable	to	that	of	a	tool	although	
its	nature	is	not	the	same	(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	114).	
																																																													
12	Philosophy	of	technology	had	already	underlined	this	mutual	relationship	between	
tools	and	words	(see	Eyth	1924,	12).	
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The	resemblance	to	Cassirer’s	point	of	view	is	absolutely	impressive.	The	sen-
tence	on	the	chopper	confirms	this	argumentation:	technology	is	nothing	but	a	
symbolic	scheme	of	reproduction,	based	on	the	constant	availability	of	an	op-
erative	code.	The	character	of	Bestand (Heidegger	2000,	5-36)	of	 the	techno-
logical	being	depends	on	the	stable	work	of	the	technological	acting.	Moreover,	
the	 symbolic	 character	 of	 technology	 is	 proved	 by	 the	 mutual	 implication	 of	
gesture	 and	 tool:	 the	 coordination	 of	 both	 originates	 a	 sort	 of	 semiotics	 of	
technology,	and,	even	better,	validates	the	fact	that	technology	itself	is	symbol-
ical.	In	favour	of	the	latter	conclusion,	also	speaks	Leroi-Gourhan’s	integration	
of	 the	 mechanism	 technology-language	 with	 a	 third	 aesthetical	 dimension	
(Leroi-Gourhan	1993,	II,	269-280).	
	
iii)	The unity of the symbolical dimension and the meta-environmental tension of 
human acting. The	 symbolic	 character	 of	 language	 is	 then	 evident	 since	 the	
Neanderthalians,	and	sets	up	the	conditions	of	possibility	of	specific	stages	of	
human	 culture,	 the	 first	 one	 of	 which	 is	 of	 course	 religion.	 The	contiguity	 of	
technology	and	symbolics	compels	us	 to	understand	the	development	of	 lan-
guage	as	the	development	of	a	system,	containing	the	rules	through	which	the	
operations	with	signs	have	been	made	possible.	Accordingly,	language	is	logics,	
viz.	a	codified	structure	of	 technological	operations	with	signs.	However,	 it	 is	
once	again	needed	to	stress	the	uniqueness	of	the	symbolical	dimension,	from	
which	 technology	 and	 language	 depart	 as	 branches	 of	 the	 same	 tree.	 Let	me	
conclude	 by	 saying	 that	 the	 meta-environmental	 qualification	 of	 this	 dimen-
sion	is	undoubtedly	upheld	by	Leroi-Gourhan	too:	
We	seem	to	have	lost	nothing	of	what	may	have	been	our	remote	
kinship	 with	 the	 trilobite	 or	 the	 earthworm.	 Every	 element	 of	
psychological	 organization	 that	 the	 vertebrate	 needs	 for	 its	 vital	
balance	 we	 need	 too.	 But	 all	 these	 elements	 are	 the	 steering	
wheel	that	steers	our	vegetative	activity	behind	what	is	particular	
and	peculiar	to	ourselves	alone:	our	symbolizing	faculty	[…],	that	
property	 of	 the	 human	 brain	 that	 consists	 in	 maintaining	 a	 dis-
tance	 between	 lived	 experience	 and	 the	 organism	 that	 serves	 as	
its	 medium.	 The	 problem	 of	 the	 dialogue	 between	 the	 individual	
and	society,	which	has	come	up	in	connection	with	the	question	of	
intelligence	 and	 instinct	 […]	 is	 nothing	 other	 than	 this	 capacity	
human	beings	have	of	distancing	 themselves	 from	their	environ-
ment,	 both	 external	 and	 internal	 (Leroi-Gourhan	 1993,	 II,	 234-
235).	
Nevertheless,	 it	 must	 be	 pointed	 out	 that	 the	 “meta-environmentality”	 argu-
ment	 is	 not	 new	 in	 the	 history	 of	 the	 philosophical	 anthropology.	 As	 is	 well	
known,	 a	 meta-environmental	 definition	 of	 the	 human	 acting	 has	 been	
stressed	by	Gehlen	in	the	same	years	of	Cassirer	(Gehlen	1988,	24-32).	How-
ever,	 there	 is	 still	 a	 difference	 between	 Cassirer	 and	 the	 great	 philosophical	
anthropologists	and	between	these	ones	and	Leroi-Gourhan’s	approach.	In	the	
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first	 case,	 as	 Bermes	has	 pointed	out,	Cassirer	 focuses	 on	 the	 analysis	 of	 the	
technological	acting	as	distinctive	characteristic	of	man,	rather	than	asking	the	
question	 on	 the	 worth	 of	 technology	 for	 men;	 to	 him,	 technology	 is	 not	 the	
answer	to	a	biological	lack,	but	a	specific	and	original	attitude	tied	to	the	sym-
bolic	 faculty	 (Bermes	 2012,	 592).	 In	 Leroi-Gourhan,	 technology	 has	 in	 turn	
manifested	its	biological	root,	so	that,	in	the	light	of	the	biology	of	technology	
and	society,	the	ethical	destination	cannot	be	conceived	as	the	real	human	di-
mension	 at	 all.	 Strictly	 speaking,	 ethical	 freedom	 would	 remain,	 to	 Leroi-
Gourhan,	a	biological	product:	we	may	wholly	understand	the	meaning	of	this	
tendence,	if	we	will	be	able	to	consider	the	latter	as	a	transposition	of	the	bio-
logical	scheme	into	a	new	situation,	in	which	the	biological	chains	appears	to	
be	definitely	overcome,	but	according	to	which	a	general	and	functional	struc-
ture	of	the	acting	is	confirmed.	On	the	contrary,	from	Cassirer’s	point	of	view,	
the	direction	of	the	symbolization	function,	although	it	appears	to	be	biologi-
cally	 founded,	 goes	 downward,	 and	 its	 constitutive	 aspect	 for	 the	 originally	
human	 acting	 seems	 to	 aftwerwards	 imply	 a	 whole	 metabasis eis allo genos 
(Bermes	 2012,	595;	Möckel	2005,	342-343).	 It	 is	correct	 to	state	 that	within	
the	human	acting	there	has	been	a	special	overthrow	of	the	biological	nature,	
but	this	special	upturning	can	never	be	seen	as	a	sort	of	removed	element	of	
the	 identity	of	mankind.	Hence	we	are	obliged	to	review	Cassirer’s	 theory,	 in	
order	to	correct	and	specify	the	phenomenological	aim	of	his	approach.	
9. The Transcendental Grounding of the Human Acting 
	
On	what	basis	a	 transcendental	 foundation	of	 the	human	acting	can	be	 justi-
fied?	In	order	to	answer	this	question,	we	can	give	a	look	at	the	very	source	of	
the	 transcendental	 argument	 on	 acting,	 viz.	 Kant’s	 Kritik der praktischen 
Vernunft.	The	starting	point	of	 the	second	Critique	consist	of	 the	 indubitable	
existence	of	an	a priori moral	law	(Kant	1990,	A	56-57;	A	81),	as	well	as,	in	the	
field	of	scientific	knowledge,	we	began	from	the	universal	laws	of	nature;	but	
in	the	case	of	the	natural	knowledge	we	must	admit	that	the	a priori functions	
of	 reason	 are	 limited	 in	 accordance	 with	 our	 experience,	 and	 this	 does	 not	
happen	with	the	moral	acting.	When	we	are	answering	the	question	“What	we	
have	to	do?”,	we	must	put	aside	the	influence	of	sensitivity	on	the	formulation	
of	the	judgement	motivating	our	action	(Kant	1990,	A	38-40).	The	analysis	of	
the	 logical	 structure	 of	 the	 moral	 commands	 is	 quite	 clear,	 and	 it	 hardly	 de-
serves	a	comment:	the	choice	of	individuating	the	very	meaning	of	the	acting	
in	the	“categorical	imperatives”	does	not	leave	room	for	uncertainty.	However,	
the	 purity	 of	 moral	 reason	 does	 not	 imply	 the	 annihilation	 of	 the	 biological	
dimension,	insofar	as	the	sensitive	stimuli	are	not	deleted,	but	they	rather	re-
sult	 to	 be	 overcome	 under	 the	 action	 of	moral	 reason	 (Kant	 1990,	 A	 57-58).	
Every	time	we	are	ethically	acting,	this	does	not	mean	that	we	do	not	experi-
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ence	 the	 sensitive	 world	 of	 our	 feelings	 or	 needs;	 on	 the	 contrary,	 we	 con-
sciously	decide	to	withhold	it	after	having	tasted	its	inflammatory	roots.	Hence	
the	“withholding”	of	the	natural	world	within	the	moral	acting	is	far	from	im-
plying	 the	 cancellation	 of	 the	 sensitive	 nature,	 and	 it	 rather	 means	 the	 con-
stant	and	progressive	overshooting	of	the	latter.	
If	we	imagine	applying	this	“scheme	of	the	overshooting”	to	the	palaeontologi-
cal	scale,	we	might	depict	a	broadened	version	of	the	critical	theory	of	acting,	
as	though	we	encountered	a	specific	degree	of	symbolization	of	the	biological	
world	 for	 each	 stage	 of	 the	 acting.	 Considering	 the	 whole	 range	 of	 Leroi-
Gourhan’s	 and	 Cassirer’s	 theories,	 we	 may	 envisage	 a	 progressive	 empower-
ment	of	 the	symbolic	 function,	so	that	 from	the	first	pole	of	 the	acting	to	the	
last	one	the	distance	between	the	biological	starting	point	and	its	relative	de-
gree	of	symbolization	has	widened	and	reached	its	final	form.	We	can	schema-
tize	as	follows:	
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Therefore,	we	ascertain	the	greater	gap	between	biology	and	culture	in	the	
fourth	stage,	but	the	process	of	liberation	has	become	in	the	deepest	nest	of	
the	 belonging	 of	 man	 to	 nature:	 even	 in	 his	 first	 steps	 on	 Earth,	 man	 ap-
pears	to	be	a	vector	of	freedom,	since	his	biology	involves	a	special	impulse	
for	the	overcoming	of	the	biology	of	nature.	Kant	himself,	 in	Anthropologie in 
pragmatischer Hinsicht,	 conceived	 the	 technological	 disposition	 as	 the	 first	
characteristic	moment	of	the	human	identity,	together	with	the	pragmatic	dis-
position	and	the	moral	one;	he	even	explicitly	admitted	that	the	human	reason	
is	 somehow	 shaped	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 form	 and	 of	 the	 organization	 of	 the	
hand	(see	the	starting	quote	of	the	paper:	Kant	1880,	255),	since	the	structure	
of	the	latter	seems	to	imply	a	sort	of	indetermination,	which	prepares	man	to	
the	 use	 of	 reason	 (Gebrauch der Vernunft).	 The	 lack	 of	 specialization	 of	 the	
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hand	sharpens	the	human	wits,	and	do	correspond	to	an	extended	capacity	of	
dominating	 reality	 through	 intelligence,	 which	 then	 in	 its	 first	 meaning	 is	
technology.	It	is	not	by	chance,	indeed,	that	the	reason	is	something	we	use	in	
order	 to	 gain	 a	 knowledge	 of	 our	 environment,	 that	 through	 this	act	can	 be-
come	what	we	are	used	to	call	“external	reality”	or	simply	“reality”13.	Human	
biology	is	in	itself	a	first	degree	of	separation	from	the	biology	of	nature:	the	
process	still	goes	on,	until	man	realizes	his	complete	separation	from	his	own	
biology,	in	the	perception	that	in	the	world	of	ethics	he	has	to	stare	at	the	pure	
contemplation	of	the	ideals	of	the	acting	(the	idea	of	social	justice,	of	equality,	
of	human	rights	etc.;	Kant	1880,	255-257).	In	the	world	of	culture,	within	the	
field	of	figurative	arts	and	in	the	highest	expressions	of	spirit	in	general,	there	
is	no	doubt	that	the	symbolization	function	is	far	from	the	biological	origin	of	
the	species,	insofar	as	we	would	not	propend	for	conceiving	the	“Monna	Lisa”	
as	an	exclusive	product	of	the	neurophysiological	stimuli	and	responses	guid-
ing	 the	 hand	 of	 the	 painter.	 There	 the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 our	 being	 in	 the	
world	is	completely	explained.	At	the	same	time,	the	shape	of	the	human	biol-
ogy	 penetrates	 in	 the	 world	 of	 culture	 too,	 since	 the	 old	 technological	 para-
digm	appears	to	be	transposed	in	the	function	of	symbolization.	The	techno-
logical	gestures	according	to	which	men	were	used	to	model	matter	and	create	
tools	had	to	depend	onto	the	setting	of	an	external	idea	of	the	working	of	the	
tool	itself.	This	is	the	idea	of	the	action	the	tool	has	to	carry	out,	and	it	implies	
the	consolidation	of	 the	meaning	of	 the	action	as	an	 independent	element	of	
the	 action	 itself:	 this	 paradigm	 might	 be	 perhaps	 modified	 during	 the	 use	of	
the	tool,	but	it	works	as	a	goal	the	tool	must	accomplish,	if	it	has	to	be	a	good	
																																																													
13	Luft	has	however	noticed	that	Kant’s	anthropology	sets	up	a	different	point	of	view	
than	that	argued	in	the	transcendental	philosophy,	since	the	empirical	commitment	of	
the	former	undermined	the	a priori status	of	the	latter	(Luft	2015,	382).	His	review	of	
the	transcendental	grounding	of	anthropology	addresses	the	question	of	an	a priori of	
culture,	 to	be	found	in	the	common	elements	of	 invariance	among	different	mythical	
representations	(Luft	2015,	390-399).	It	is	clear	that	this	is	not	our	approach;	on	the	
contrary,	 we	 seek	 a	 condition	 of	 possibility	 in	 the	 biological	 framework,	 in	 order	 to	
show	that	the	function	of	symbolization	is	already	at	work	in	the	deepest	roots	of	our	
physiological	 origin.	 The	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 a priori, starting	 from	 the	 invariants	
within	the	mythical	stories,	is	certainly	an	interesting	and	fruitful	attempt	at	building	a	
universal	picture	of	the	symbolic	reality	of	myth,	but	 it	 limits	 itself	 to	a	second-hand	
description.	We	might	indeed	point	out	that	the	reconstruction	goes	through	the	lan-
guage	in	which	the	stories	are	told:	this	means	that	we	always	face	an	interpretation,	
even	though	we	would	be	able	to	follow	the	general	dynamics	of	the	setting	of	a	proto-
type	of	all	these	stories,	and	to	put	it	as	a	model	of	the	human	mind.	On	the	contrary,	
our	aim	at	presenting	a	sort	of	physiological	theory	of	the	transcendental	dimension	of	
the	human	acting,	by	means	of	the	analysis	of	the	technological	faculty,	would	like	to	
tie	 the	 empirical	 and	 the	 rational	 sphere,	 arguing	 the	 existence	 of	 a	 general	 form	 of	
acting,	whose	inner	disposition	is	strictly	symbolic,	since	its	biological	beginning.	It	is	
solely	why	 the	 freedom	of	 the	hand	from	the	ground	 is	already	symbolic,	 that	 in	 the	
world	 of	 culture	 we	 can	 recognize	 those	 peculiar	 liberations	 leading	 man	 into	 the	
realm	of	the	a priori	as	a	ultimate	expression	of	that	ancient	freedom.	
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instrument.	It	is	more	the	instrument	that	depends	on	the	paradigm	than	the	
paradigm	to	be	shaped	by	the	tool.	
If	we	finally	analyze	one	of	the	highest	forms	of	culture,	i.	e.	ethics,	into	which	
we	would	not	have	to	encounter	any	shadow	of	 the	sensitive	reality,	we	may	
indeed	observe	that	the	general	structure	of	the	acting	mirrors	the	scheme	of	
the	 technological	 gesture.	 The	 external	 paradigmatic	 idea	 is,	 in	 this	 case,	 the	
presumption	of	an	idea	of	Justice,	whose	name	is	not	as	important	as	its	plain	
existence	 –	 it	 might	 be	 called	 “God”	 and	 nothing	 would	 change	 –:	 as	 in	 the	
technological	dimension	we	tried	to	adequate	the	tools	to	their	function,	in	the	
ethical	actions	we	seek	the	moral	perfection	through	the	attempt	of	adapting	
our	 acting	 to	 Justice	 or	 Good.	 Between	 the	 goals	of	 the	 technological	 actions	
and	 those	 of	 the	 ethical	 ones	 there	 is	 only	 a	 substantial difference,	 whereas,	
from	a	structural	point	of	view,	we	are	always	acting	in	order	to	reach	a	perfect	
performance	of	the	action.	The	perfection	of	the	action	obviously	depends	on	
the	adaptation	degree	of	the	tool	to	the	idea	the	tool	must	give	tangible	form,	
as	well	as	the	perfection	of	a	moral	action	is	strictly	connected	to	its	adequacy	
to	perform	the	pure	idea	of	Justice.	In	Kant’s	transcendental	foundation	of	eth-
ics	this	is	precisely	argued	through	the	idea	of	“the	highest	Good”	(Kant	1990,	
A	194;	A	198-203).	Nevertheless,	it	is	crucially	important	to	underline	that	the	
whole	system	stands	because	a	perfect	adequacy	is	in	principle	impossible:	as	
the	ethical	actions	could	not	grasp	the	pure	idea	of	the	moral	acting,	in	which	
the	aim	of	the	acting	is	perfectly	adequate	to	its	ultimate	meaning	(the	union	
of	 “virtue”	 and	 “happiness”)14,	 the	 technological	 actions	 cannot	 completely	
adapt	themselves	to	the	idea	of	the	acting.	The	creation	of	a	chopper	does	not	
exhaust	 the	 general	 idea	 of	 cutting,	 just	 as	 a	 good	 action	 does	 not	 mean	 the	
totality	 of	 the	moral	 acting.	 If	 we	 were	 able	 to	refill	 that	 distance,	 the	acting	
would	cease	in	the	stasis	of	a	pure	contemplation	and	the	dynamical	spirit	of	
life	would	be	annihilated.	
The	 transcendental	status	of	 the	acting	does	mean	the	 inexhaustibility	of	ac-
tion:	we	have	a	paradigmatic	model,	that	we	cannot	touch	with	our	own	hands,	
and	that	works	as	a	sort	of	horizon	we	will	never	able	to	walk	on.	The	function	
of	 the	 paradigm	 consists	 of	 its	unachievable	 essence	 and	 compels	 us	 to	 con-
stantly	seek	the	perfect	adaptation	of	our	will	to	the	contempt	of	the	abstract	
																																																													
14	This	 depends	 on	 the	 inner	 structure	 of	 the	 moral	 acting,	 i.	 e.	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
overshooting	never	means	the	annihilation	of	the	sensitive	sphere;	the	solution	of	the	
basic	antinomy	of	the	practical	reason	is	indeed	the	setting	of	two	postulates,	enabling	
the	access	to	the	realm	of	the	highest	Good.	These	postulates	do	not	address	any	actual	
existence	 of	 immortal	 substances	 (soul	 and	 God),	 but	 they	 solely	 imply	 the	 urgent	
hypothesis	of	 their	own	 function:	motivating	our	action	 toward	the	perfection	of	 the	
moral	meaning,	that	would	be	otherwise	ungraspable.	The	same	concept	of	the	highest	
Good	is	meant	by	Kant	as	“Beförderung”	(Kant	1990,	A	205),	viz.	as	a	promoted	goal	by	
the	practical	reason,	in	order	to	justify	the	fact	that	a	virtuous	action	could	also	be	a	
source	of	happiness	and	not	a	mere	mortification	of	the	sensitive	reality,	to	which	feel-
ings	and	needs	are	tied.	
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idea:	this	is	the	only	reason	why	we	can	keep	acting.	It	is	clear	that	we	solely	
act	because	we	can	never	cease	to	act:	only	 if	we	can	look	for	something	un-
graspable	we	will	continue	our	research	 to	embrace	 it.	Furthermore,	 it	 is	 re-
markable	that	this	capacity	of	setting		an	independent	goal	from	the	sensitive	
reality	is,	 in	the	§	83	of	the	Kritik der Urteilskraft,	 the	very	element	of	human	
culture15	as	system	of	the	overshooting	of	this	reality	(Kant	1922,	509-514).	
Hence	it	is	not	by	chance	that	the	technological	acting	and	the	ethical	one	ap-
pear	to	be	based	on	the	same	structurally	functional	circle,	even	though	from	
the	zoological	technology	to	the	symbolic	ethics	many	things	are	changed.	But	
the	 fact	 that	 we	 cannot	 remember	 those	 old	 times	 in	 which	 flavours	 were	
pleasanter	 than	ever,	does	 not	mean	that	everything	has	been	 lost	under	 the	
frozen	 ground	 of	 a	 betrayed	 youth	 of	 the	 spirit.	 The	 biological	 memory	 has	
been	 transposed	 in	 the	 fully	 symbolic	 acting,	 and	 the	 scheme	 is	 now	 shaped	
according	to	a	perfect	clarification	of	what	was	implicit	before,	but	in	the	sym-
bolic	acting	we	find	the	same	structural	characteristics	of	the	biological	action.	
We	act	staring	at	a	goal	we	will	never	reach,	as	well	as	our	actions	 are	 tools	
modelled	 on	 the	 idea	 of	 a	 superior	 form	 of	 the	 moral	 acting,	 viz.	 the	 idea	 of	
Justice.	
10. Conclusion 
	
Cassirer	directly	deals	with	the	question	of	the	proximity	between	technology	
and	symbolics.	A	1930s	essay,	Form und Technik,	addresses	the	question,	and	
elaborates	 a	 theory	 of	 the	 spiritual	 acting,	according	 to	 which	 the	 plastic	ca-
pacity	 of	 technological	 action	 implies	 a	 symbolical	 tension.	 Tools	 witness	
above	 all	 a	 “Grundrichtung des Erzeugens”	 (basic	 direction	 of	 the	 producing),	
and	 an	 analogy	 between	 technology	 and	 language	 is	 manifestly	 developed,	
since	they	are	both	means	of	the	“Bemächtigung der Wirklichkeit”	(appropriat-
ing	of	reality).	Human	activity	 is	based	on	mediation,	and	Spirit	 itself,	as	dis-
tinctive	attribute	of	human	life,	is	a	mediating	form	(Bayer	2001,	41-51).	Cas-
sirer	 points	 out	 that	 man	 is	 at	 the	 same	 time	 “vernünftig”	 (reasonable)	 und	
“werkzeugbildend”	(creator	of	 tools),	as	though	the	definition	of	man	as	“ani-
mal rationale”	or	“animal symbolicum”	and	that	of	“homo technologicus”	were	
two	manifestations	 of	 the	same	attitude,	 intended	as	 the	unity	of	an	“Akt des 
‘Fassens’” (act	of	grasping)	or	as	 “bildendes Gestalten”	 (creative	 forming).	The	
consolidation	of	the	relationship	between	the	technological	and	the	symbolical	
sphere	 is	 confirmed	 by	 the	 consideration	 of	 the	 paradigmatic	 model	 of	 the	
																																																													
15	From	 this	 point	 of	 view,	 the	 definition	 of	 “culture”	 is	 exhaustive:	 “Die Hervor-
bringung der Tauglichkeit eines vernünftiges Wesens zu beliebigen Zwecken überhaupt 
(folglich in seiner Freiheit) ist die Kultur:	The	creation	of	the	suitability,	to	a	reasonable	
being,	for	the	setting	of	a	goal	at	will	(namely	in	his	freedom)	is	culture”	(Kant	1922,	
511).	
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technological	action,	where	the	meta-environmental	element	is	clearly	depict-
ed:	
In	 its	 pure	 logical	 form,	 all	 thought	 is	 mediated.	 It	 is	 directed	 to	
the	discovery	and	extraction	of	a	mediating	structure,	which	joins	
the	opening	sentence	and	the	ending	sentence	of	a	communicative	
chain.	The	 tool	 fulfils	 the	same	 function,	 represented	here	 in	 the	
logical	 sphere,	 in	 the	 objective	 sphere	 of	 physical	 objects.	 [...]	 It	
sets	 itself	 between the	 first	 positions	 taken	 by	 the	 will	 and	 its	
goal.	 Only	 in	 this	 in-between	 position	 is	 it	 permitted	 to	separate	
them	and	set	them	at	a	proper	distance.	As	long	as	the	human	be-
ing	 makes	 use	 only	 of	 his	 limbs,	 his	 bodily	 “organs”,	 in	 order	 to	
achieve	 his	 goals,	 such	 distancing	 is	 not	 yet	 reached.	 […]	 In	 the	
tool	and	 its	application,	however,	 the	goal	 sought-after	 is	 for	 the	
first	 time	 moved	 off	 into	 the	 distance.	 Instead	 of	 looking	 spell-
bound	 at	 this	 goal,	 the	 human	 being	 learns	 to	 “fore-see”	 it.	 This	
form	 of	 seeing	 is	 all	 that	 distinguishes	 human	 intentional	 doing	
from	 animal	 istinct.	 The	 “fore-seeing”	 establishes	 “fore-thought”	
(Die «Ab-Sicht» begründet die «Voraus-Sicht»).	 It	 establishes	 the	
possibility	 of	 directing	 attention	 to	 a	 goal,	 towards	 something	
spatially	absent	and	temporally	remote,	rather	than	acting	on	an	
immediately	 given	 sensuous	 stimulus.	 It	 is	 not	 so	 much	 because	
animals	are	inferior	to	the	human	in	bodily	skill.	But	because	this	
line of sight is	 denied	 to	 animals,	 there	 is	 no	 genuine	 tool	 use	 in	
the	area	of	animal	existence	(Cassirer	2012,	30-31).	
The	resemblances	of	Cassirer’s	quote	to	Leroi-Gourhan	are	quite	evident.	The	
technological	 acting	 is	 thoroughly	 transposed	 into	 a	 “Distanzierungsprozeß”	
(Falkenburg	2012,	576-577;	Bermes	 2012,	593)	which	seems	 to	be	perfectly	
comparable	to	Leroi-Gourhan’s	dialectics	of	“liberation”	and	“exteriorization”.	
The	liberation	from	the	anatomical	limits	and	the	progressive	departing	of	the	
tool	from	its	manual	root,	implies,	as	in	Leroi-Gourhan	did,	the	consideration	
of	 the	 constitutive	 role	 of	 technology	 and	 lead	 to	 a	 phenomenology	 which,	
from	 the	 tool	 to	 the	 machines,	 realizes	 the	 maximal	 exteriorization	 (Leroi-
Gourhan	 1993,	 II:	 243–256).	 It	 is	 quite	 peculiar	 that	 the	 biological	 start	 of	
technology	ends	in	a	world	of	pure	machines,	but	this	argument	ceases	to	be	
paradoxical	if	one	remembers	that	the	freedom	from	biology	is	the	distinctive	
character	of	human	evolution.	
Moreover,	Cassirer	focuses	on	the	teleological	worth	of	the	paradigm,	and	not	
directly	on	its	ontological	status,	but	 the	 two	aspects	are	obviously	 intercon-
nected:	 the	paradigm	is	a	 form,	but	 the	 form	is	 tied	 to	 the	goal	 that	must	be	
accomplished	through	the	 tool.	The	position	of	 the	paradigm/goal	 finally	en-
tails	 the	 recognition	 of	 the	 meta-environmental	 tension:	 future	 becomes	
henceforward	the	specific	dimension	of	human	temporality	as	consequence	of	
this	 meta-environmental	 disposition	 and	 of	 the	 symbolic	 nature	 of	 human	
activity.	Tools	 and	words	are	 instead	subject	 to	 the	codification	within	a	sys-
tem	of	operations,	regulated	by	memory	and	organized	under	the	 leadership	
of	brain	in	its	relationship	with	the	material	environment.	
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In	 conclusion,	 one	 must	 say	 that	 palaeontology	 has	 deeply	 confirmed	 the	
worth	of	Cassirer’s	definition	of	“animal	symbolicum”,	but	it	has	also	showed	
that	 it	 is	 urgent	 to	 integrate	 it	 with	 a	 specific	 genealogy	 of	 the	 technological	
faculty.	However,	technology	and	symbolics	are	two	actualizations	of	a	whole	
dimension:	calling	it	“technological”	or	“symbolical”	is	solely	a	matter	of	opin-
ion.	Accordingly,	I	have	suggested	to	rename	the	unity	of	these	spheres	as	“me-
ta-environmental”	dimension.	It	follows	from	this	analysis	that	the	chronologi-
cal	determination	of	man	basically	belongs	to	the	future,	and	that	it	ends	in	the	
realization	of	its	utopian	tension	–	ethics	is	the	ultimate	form	of	the	technical	
gesture	as	well	as	machines	are	the	late	exteriorization	of	manual	technology.	
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Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen.	Hamburg:	Rowohlt.	
Renz,	 U.	 2002.	 Die Rationalität der Kultur. Zur Kulturphilosophie und ihrer 
transzendentalen Begründung bei Cohen, Natorp und Cassirer.	 Ham-
burg:	Meiner	Verlag.	
Ruin,	 H.	 2012.	 Technology	 as	 Destiny	 in	 Cassirer	 and	 Heidegger:	 Continuing	
the	Davos	Debate.	In	A.	Sissel	Hoel	&	I.	Folkvord	(eds) Ernst Cassirer on 
Form and Technology. Contemporary Readings.	 Basingstoke	 (UK):	 Pal-
grave	&	Macmillan,	113–138.	
Schacht,	R.	2015.	Gehlen,	Nietzsche,	and	the	Project	of	a	Philosophical	Anthro-
pology.	 In	 P.	 Honenberger	 (ed.)	 Naturalism and Philosophical Anthro-
pology.	London:	Palgrave	MacMillan 49–65.	
Simmel,	G.	19222. Lebensanschauung. Vier metaphysische Kapitel [1918].	Mün-
chen	–	Leipzig:	Duncker	&	Humblot.	
Sissel	Hoel,	A.	2012.	Technics	of	Thinking. In	A.	Sissel	Hoel	&	I.	Folkvord	(eds) 
Ernst Cassirer on Form and Technology. Contemporary Readings.	 Ba-
singstoke	(UK):	Palgrave	&	Macmillan,	65–91.	
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Man and Future: A Palaeontological and Chronological Foundation of Cassirer’s 
Definition of Man As “Animal Symbolicum” 
Abstract.	In	the	present	paper,	the	author	aims	at	laying	the	foundations	of	a	
symbolics	 of	 technical	 gesture,	 according	to	 the	 thesis	 that	 symbolic	 faculty	
is	 another	 face	 of	 the	 technological	 one,	 and	 that	 they	 are	 both	 in	 truth	 two	
sides	of	the	same	coin.	Accordingly,	the	author	suggests	to	rename	the	whole	
dimen-sion	 as	 “meta-environmentality”.	 The	 analysis	 is	 carried	 out	 on	 the	
basis	 of	 a	 specific	 comparison	 between	 Cassirer’s	 definition	 of	 “animal 
symbolicum”	 and	 its	 scientific	 consistence	 in	 the	 light	 of	 modern	
palaeontology.	“Animal symbol-icum”	 is	 here	 compared	 with	 Leroi-Gourhan’s	
homo	 technologicus,	 and	Cassi-rer’s	 ideas	 on	 human	 identity	 tested	 starting	
from	 paleoanthropological	 data.	The	result	of	the	inquiry	lead	us	to	recognize	
the	 urgency	 of	 integrating	 Cassi-rer’s	 argument	 with	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	
technological	capacity,	but	a	deep	anal-ysis	 of	 the	 characterizing	 attributes	
of	 the	 latter	 compels	 us	 to	 uphold	 the	 symbolic	 attitude	 of	 the	
technological	dimension.	The	author	then	sketches	a	basic	 description	 of	 the	
guidelines	 of	 a	 symbolic	 theory	 of	 technology	 (espe-cially	 §§	 6-7),	 and	 tries	
to	 show	 how	 the	 basic	 elements	 of	 such	 an	 approach	were	 familiar	 both	 to	
Cassirer	 and	 Leroi-Gourhan.	 As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 whole	 theory,	 the	
author	 elaborates	 a	 chronological	 analysis	 of	 human	 identity,	 whose	 basic	
result	 is	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 future	 as	 main	 temporal	 dimen-sion	 of	
human	acting.	
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